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Climate Change Negotiations: 
Legal and Other Issues on the 
Road to Paris 
Susan Biniaz,† 
This article is born of a panel discussion from September 
18, 2015, regarding “Regulating and Treaty-Making: Addressing 
Climate Change under the Obama Presidency.” The article 
examines issues that affected discussions shortly before the final 
negotiations at the United Nations Climate Change Conference 
in Paris in 2015.  
Thank you for having me. I would like to address some of the 
issues surrounding the current climate change negotiations. They are 
in their fourth year and are expected to culminate in an agreement on 
December 11th in Paris. 
We are operating under the so-called “Durban mandate, which 
has two features worth mentioning: 
The first feature is that the agreement under negotiation is to 
be “applicable to all Parties.”  That may sound tautological, in 
that an agreement is, of course, applicable to all of its Parties. 
But that phrase was actually very significant politically, given 
the history of the climate change regime. The Berlin mandate 
set the parameters of the negotiation that led to the Kyoto 
Protocol.  It provided, in essence, that the agreement was to be 
“applicable to some,” i.e., it excluded any new commitments for 
developing countries. In this respect, the Durban mandate set 
the expectation for quite a different outcome than the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
The second feature is that the agreement is to have some type 
of “legal force.”  This does not necessarily mean that the 
outcome must be a fully legally binding instrument. At the 
same time, the clear intent was to create something with more 
legal content than the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, which was an 
entirely non-legally binding instrument. 
 
 Susan Biniaz is the lead climate change lawyer for the United States 
Department of State and a former Deputy Legal Adviser for the U.S. 
Department of State. 
† The views expressed in this paper are those of the author alone and are 
not intended to reflect the positions of the United States Department of 
State or any other department or agency of the U.S. Government.  
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Now I would like to turn to some of the current issues. I will start 
with the question of “ambition.” There seems to be widespread 
consensus that the agreement should be designed to be “ambitious,” 
and, when countries use this descriptor, they generally mean 
ambitious in relation to the agreed global temperature goal (i.e., 
keeping the increase below two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial 
levels). The challenge is how to promote ambition in a way that also 
encourages broad participation in the ultimate agreement.  
There is the theoretical option of taking the global temperature 
goal, translating it into the maximum allowable level of global 
greenhouse gas emissions, and allocating a particular amount to each 
Party. Such an approach would secure the necessary ambition, but it 
would not achieve broad participation. Many countries would not 
accept being told how much how they can emit. And that assumes 
countries could even reach agreement on how to allocate emissions in 
the first place. It is more likely that they would have very different 
notions on what the relevant factors are and how they should be 
weighed.  
As an alternative to such a “top down” approach, our negotiating 
team had the idea of having each Party “nationally determine” its 
own mitigation contribution. Such an approach would be more likely 
to garner broad participation, given that it would allow a Party to 
design its target or measures based on its national circumstances. But 
this approach raised the question of how to avoid low ambition. So we 
coupled the notion of “nationally determined” targets with the idea of 
having Parties lay out their targets in advance of Paris. The hope was 
that, if Parties knew that their targets would be exposed to the light 
of day well before December, the “sunshine” would in itself provide a 
good incentive to put forward their best efforts.  
This concept was agreed to internationally and is basically what 
has been going on this year. Parties have been submitting their so-
called “intended nationally determined contributions,” or “INDCs.” 
The United States announced a target of 26-28% below 2005 levels in 
2025, which was done in conjunction with China in the Joint 
Announcement last November. At the moment, about a hundred 
INDCs have been submitted. Of course, targets set in 2015 that only 
go out to 2025 or 2030 are not going to be enough in relation to the 
global temperature goal. Therefore, the United States considers that 
the agreement should include other elements to promote ambition: 
It should call upon Parties to regularly submit successive 
emissions targets, preferably every 5 years.  
There should be an expectation that Parties’ targets move in a 
forward direction (which has been referred to as “progression”).  
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Parties should be encouraged to produce longer-term strategies 
or scenarios for how they will move to low-carbon or low-
emissions economies.  
The Paris outcome should include a platform for sub-national 
governments and businesses to reflect their commitments.  
Now I will turn to what many in the negotiating process call 
“accountability.” We need to design the agreement to make Parties 
accountable for what they agree to take on. The issue has a number 
of dimensions: 
First, Parties need to be clear about what they are 
undertaking. One of the problems with the Copenhagen Accord 
was that many Parties were not very clear about the meaning of 
their pledges; in fact, it took many months and workshops to 
get a sense of what they were committing to do 
Second, there is a history of “conditionality” in the climate 
regime: “we’ll do X if others do X” or “we’ll do X if we get 
external funding,” etc. Here, we are saying that at least a part 
of each Party’s undertaking needs to be unconditional. It is 
acceptable if the Party includes another component that might 
be achieved conditionally. But, without any unconditional piece, 
a Party is not really accountable for anything. 
Third, there need to be some rules and norms. Mitigation 
targets will be nationally determined, but there should be some 
agreed parameters when it comes to, for example, how a Party 
accounts for various aspects of its target. There have been two 
extremes in the climate regime so far. The Kyoto Protocol 
dictated nearly every aspect of a Party’s target, while the 
Copenhagen Accord was very open-ended. Here, we need to find 
the proper balance, in order to encourage broad participation 
but also promote accuracy and environmental integrity. 
Fourth, Parties need to report on their greenhouse gas 
emissions, as well as on the progress they are making in 
implementing and achieving their targets. 
Fifth, there needs to be adequate review of implementation, 
both to know whether individual Parties are achieving their 
targets and to see whether the world, in the aggregate, is on 
track in relation to the global temperature goal. 
Some would argue that Parties will not be accountable for their 
mitigation targets unless they are legally binding. Others would say 
that this is not the case, given that there are plenty of examples, both 
within and outside the climate world, of non-compliance with legally 
binding commitments and “compliance” with non-legally binding 
ones. Further, in this case, reporting and review are essential features 
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of accountability that do not necessarily follow from the legal 
character of commitments. There are also potential downsides to 
legally binding targets in this context, including the potential for 
Parties to reduce their level of ambition if they are concerned about 
violating a legal obligation and the likelihood that a legally binding 
approach will deter some Parties from participating in the new 
agreement. One option under consideration is a “hybrid” approach, 
put forward by New Zealand, which combines non-legally binding 
targets with legally binding commitments to put forward successive 
targets on a regular basis, to provide clarifying information, to report, 
and to be reviewed. 
A third issue at play is that of “differentiation.”  This issue 
relates to whether Parties are treated the same or differently and, if 
differently, on what basis. In the 1992 Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, there was a very light divide between the 
commitments of the Parties listed in Annex I of the Convention (so-
called “Annex I Parties”) and other Parties.  Those in Annex I had 
heightened reporting obligations and a non-legally binding emissions 
aim.  It is the Kyoto Protocol that sharpened the divide between the 
two categories, including legally binding emissions targets for Annex I 
Parties and essentially excluded non-Annex I Parties from any new 
commitments. The Copenhagen Accord moved back toward the less 
bifurcated nature of the Convention, with certain separate provisions 
for Annex I and non-Annex I Parties, but with everyone expected to 
take on emissions pledges of some sort. 
For Paris, no one is taking the position that all Parties need to do 
the same thing. Rather, it is widely recognized that Parties have 
widely varying national circumstances. Some consider that the Annex 
I/non-Annex I categories should continue to play a role in the Paris 
agreement. Others, including the United States, consider that a 
climate agreement based on categories from 1992, or even based on a 
rigid divide between developed and developing countries, would not 
be a tenable approach to an agreement that takes effect from 2020 
and is intended to be long-lasting. The challenge will be how to reflect 
appropriate differentiation among Parties across the various elements 
of the agreement in a manner that is acceptable to all. 
So, how will these and other issues get resolved?  There are many 
possibilities:  
Parties might change their positions on an issue so as to 
achieve convergence. 
Parties might trade one issue for another.   
Sometimes Parties will agree to state who will do what under 
an agreement and avoid the question of “why,” which can raise 
ideological questions. 
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Issues in the climate regime have on occasion been addressed 
through “constructive ambiguity,” such as the use of a comma 
that arguably allows a sentence to be read in two different 
ways. 
Contentious issues are often postponed for resolution, for 
example, by having the agreement direct the Parties to address 
an issue at a later date. 
An issue might be sent to a different forum, such as the Kyoto 
Protocol’s sending issues regarding international aviation and 
maritime emissions to ICAO and IMO, respectively. 
An issue might be addressed in a lower-profile “decision” of 
the Parties, rather in the agreement per se. 
A controversial provision might be made more acceptable by 
softening its legal character or by lengthening the time period 
during which it must be fulfilled.  
It is likely that some or all of these methods will be necessary to 
putting together the final deal in Paris.    
 
 
